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A Fundamentally Different Regulatory Calculus:
The Advent of Regulation D, Rule 506(c)
Ashley J. Hersutamto*
On July 10, 2013, for the first time in thirty-one years, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) substantively amended Regulation D,
Rule 506 (“Rule 506”),1 an exemption from the registration of securities
offerings under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “33 Act”).2
To most, this would scarcely merit notice. Who can keep up with all
the overly technical financial and securities regulatory shakeups of this era?
What do any of them really mean to the average investor anyway?
Perversely, the law that mandated this amendment, the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”), garnered significant public and
press attention, although not for Title II, the portion of the Act that
precipitated the July 2013 amendment.3 Innocuously entitled “Access to
Capital for Job Creators,” Title II required the SEC to, among other things,
lift the prohibition on general solicitation long associated with Rule 506
offerings.4
Title II’s commandment engendered a radical about-face with respect
to a very old exemption from registration for so-called “private offerings”
of unlimited size under the 33 Act. This about-face was so radical that this
Comment was first conceived as little more than an indictment of Title II
*

Florida International University College of Law, J.D. candidate 2015. This Comment is
dedicated to my family, whose unconditional love and support sustain me, and to my mother, of whom I
am proud beyond measure. Deepest thanks to Professor José Gabilondo for reviewing an earlier draft of
this Comment; your kindness and wisdom are incomparable.
1 See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9415, Exchange Act Release No.
34-69959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Rule 506(c) Adopting Release].
2 See id. “Regulation D” refers to a set of SEC-promulgated rules, codified at 17 C.F.R §§
230.501-.508, under the 33 Act. Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506 all provide specific exemptions from
registration of offerings of securities under the 33 Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (2014). Rule 506
is the subject of this Comment. Rule 501, Rule 502, Rule 503, Rule 507, and Rule 508 of Regulation D
set forth certain terms and conditions applicable to the three Regulation D exemptions. See 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501-.503, .507-.508 (2014).
3 The JOBS Act, signed into law April 5, 2012, was newsworthy because it permitted, for the first
time, “crowdfunding,” a method of capital formation which is very much a creature of our age. See
generally, Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Signs “JOBS Act” into Law, Calls It a “Game-Changer”, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-signs-jobs-act-into-law-calls-ita-game-changer; Small Business and the SEC: Crowdfunding, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/qasbsec.htm#crowdfunding (last modified Feb. 27, 2014).
4 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313-15 (2012).
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and the lifting of the Rule 506 prohibition against general solicitation.
Having worked in an industry5 whose bread-and-butter is Rule 506
offerings, it seemed impossible, or at least highly improbable, that the
general solicitation prohibition would ever not be a part of the Rule. The
prohibition, though sometimes bemoaned, was that much a part of that
industry’s atmosphere, its very horizon.
And yet, as I commenced my research, I realized ending the ban on
general solicitation was but a symptom of a much greater systemic change.
The altering of Rule 506 at Congress’s behest did not just, perhaps
imprudently, “modernize” an old and outmoded exemption—it altogether
discarded a long-standing and complex regulatory judgment that artfully
balanced efficient capital formation and investor protection. It substituted
for that judgment a problematic urgency that encourages issuers to raise as
much capital, from as many investors, with as little regulation as possible,
whatever the consequences.
This Comment is divided into two parts: the first accesses Rule 506
from a textual standpoint, while the second considers Rule 506’s extratextual historical development and its present-day realities. Together, these
analyses provide a clear picture of the philosophical disjunction between the
original and new components of the Rule; they demonstrate the new,
fundamentally different regulatory calculus now embedded in Rule 506.
Part I is focused on the mechanics and text of Rule 506. It first
situates Rule 506 within the vast universe of U.S. federal and state
securities regulation. With that basic foundation laid, Part I continues by
examining current Rule 506 (which contains both Rule 506(b), the original
Rule 506 exemption, and Rule 506(c), the “new” Rule 506 exemption
inaugurated by the JOBS Act). A close reading of Rule 506(b)’s text
demonstrates that three principles underpin it: (1) investor protection, (2)
egalitarianism, and (3) fairness. As a result, Rule 506(b) effectively
balances the goal of efficient capital formation with the ameliorative aims
of all securities regulation and more. Rule 506(c) abandons this balance for
a less effective investor protection mechanism animated by a fundamentally
different regulatory rationale.
Part II steps away from the text and interrogates two problem areas in
and around Rule 506(c): (1) its novel, exclusive reliance on the accredited
investor concept; and (2) the faulty legislative narrative that led to its
promulgation. The practical and historical analyses contained in Part II
highlight the particular problematics, or “stress points,” Rule 506
encompasses today. These stress points independently evidence the new
regulatory calculus Rule 506(c) embodies.
5

Private investment funds (specifically hedge funds).
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Finally, Part III contains my concluding remarks and an enumeration
of certain issues connected with Rule 506(c) I believe need immediate
attention to ensure the exemption becomes and stays a workable one.
I. MINING THE TEXT: WHAT RULE 506 SAYS
My goal is to closely read and examine the text of Rule 506 to unpack
the principles animating the original Rule and then to determine whether
those principles persist in new Rule 506(c). However, before closely
examining the text, it is critical to have a working understanding of what
Rule 506 is. Unfortunately, like most securities laws and rules, discussion
of Rule 506 is usually either confined to a general definition6 or treated in
highly technical language.7 Though both approaches, in the appropriate
context, can be useful, neither is particularly helpful to a legal reader or,
more importantly, a lay investor unacquainted with securities regulation.
This is particularly true in the context of this Comment, which aims to
engage with Rule 506 and both its old and new components in a
fundamental way.
Accordingly, Part I begins with a “crash course” in the regulation of
securities offerings in the U.S., then narrows its focus to Rule 506, which is
but a single star in a far-flung firmament. This overview is intended to set
the stage for the reader. With a thorough understanding of where Rule 506
“fits” in the grander scheme, Rule 506’s text may be further explored and
mined for meaning.
A. A Crash Course in U.S. Securities Regulation
By default, offerings of securities must be registered under state or
federal laws.8 Although “offering” is not defined in either the 33 Act or
Regulation D,9 “offer” is. Under the 33 Act, an offer “shall include every
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or
interest in a security, for value.”10 This definition was clearly designed to
encompass, and does in fact encompass, a broad swath of transactions. A
6 See, e.g., Regulation D Offerings, SEC.GOV, https://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm (last
modified Oct. 28, 2014).
7 See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1984).
8 The U.S. securities system is truly a federal system. The federal securities acts (which include,
among others, the 33 Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of
1940) are administered by the SEC. Each state also has its own securities act (see, e.g., Fla. Stat. §§
517.011-.032 (2014)), which is administered by a state securities administrator. The provision of the
federal securities laws compelling the registration of an offering of securities is section 5 of the 33 Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2014).
9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
10 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2014).
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convenient and accessible example of an “offer” is the sale by a corporate
issuer of its common stock or of a series of its debt instruments, such as
bonds or debentures.11
Registration at any level can be costly and cumbersome, so many
issuers seek an exemption from registration. There are several exemptions
built into the securities laws, both at the state and federal levels. Section 4
of the 33 Act provides a number of such exemptions.12 Of these
exemptions, that contemplated by section 4(a)(2)13 is the authority for SECpromulgated Rule 506.14 Section 4(a)(2) provides that the registration
provisions of the 33 Act shall not apply to “transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering.”15
As an important aside, prior to 1996, an issuer’s ability to claim—or
actual claiming of—an exemption under the federal securities laws did not
immunize the issuer from the registration requirements of the states’
securities laws. Accordingly, where an issuer sought to offer securities in a
particular state, even if that same offering was exempt from federal
registration, the issuer would either: (1) have to seek a separate exemption
under the state securities laws, or (2) register the offering under the state
securities laws. It requires no great stretch of the imagination to
comprehend the great time, effort, and expense that a federally exempted
offering in, for example, multiple states (let alone all fifty states) entailed
under this regime. It is similarly clear that the burdens of these
requirements could fall disproportionately on small issuers, including small
businesses.
Congress attempted to address this precise problem through the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (the “SBIIA”).16 The SBIIA
amended section 19 of the 33 Act to explicitly articulate a policy of
cooperation between the SEC and the various state securities
administrators.17 Among the ends of the policy were the specific goals of
11

The list goes on and on; offerings of limited partnership interests are an extremely common
securities offering (particularly in the Rule 506 context). Many private investment companies (what the
investing public and media typically refer to as “hedge funds”) offer limited partnership interests to their
investors through Rule 506 offerings.
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2014).
13 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2014). Prior to April 5, 2012 (the date the JOBS Act was signed into
law), section 4(a)(2) was known as section 4(2). For purposes of this Comment, this section will be
referred to as “section 4(a)(2)” throughout, including in historical contexts.
14 Technically, Rule 506 is a “safe harbor” under section 4(a)(2). See Rule 506(c) Adopting
Release, supra note 1, at 44,772. This means “a company can be assured it is within the Section 4(a)(2)
exemption” simply by showing good faith compliance with Rule 506’s terms and conditions. See Rule
506 of Regulation D, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2014).
15 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added).
16 Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
17 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(1) (2014).

2014]

The Advent of Regulation D, Rule 506(c)

243

(1) minimum interference with the business of capital formation, and (2)
“the development of a uniform exemption from registration for small
issuers which can be agreed upon among several States or between the
States and the Federal Government.”18
Ultimately, this policy of cooperation engendered the drafting of
Regulation D, including Rule 506, by the SEC in 1982.19 Yet, the initial
promulgation of Regulation D and Rule 506 did not resolve the latent
tension and inefficiency stemming from the parallel and coextensive state
and federal securities regulatory apparatuses. As section 19 of the 33 Act,
as amended, continues to state: “The [SEC] shall have the authority [only]
to adopt . . . [a uniform exemption for small issuers] for Federal
purposes.”20 Additionally, “[n]othing in the [33 Act] shall be construed as
authorizing preemption of State law.”21
Unsurprisingly, then, in 1996, Congress enacted a further legislative
initiative, the National Securities Market Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), as
an arguably more definitive effort to dissolve cross-jurisdictional
impediments to small business capital formation. NSMIA amended section
18 of the 33 Act to preempt “any State or any political subdivision thereof”
from regulating, by law or rule, any “covered security.”22 Under amended
section 18, a covered security includes, among other things, a security
exempt from registration under the 33 Act by virtue of SEC rules or
regulations issued under section 4(a)(2).23 Accordingly, NSMIA’s state
preemption extends to Rule 506, which is an SEC-promulgated safe harbor
under section 4(a)(2).

18

15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(2)-(3) (2014).
See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251-01 (Mar. 8, 1982)
[hereinafter Regulation D Adopting Release (1982)]. As discussed further below, Rule 506 is unique
among the Regulation D rules in that it does not condition its exemption on the offering raising no more
than a specific total amount of capital. See infra p. 246. It is questionable whether an issuer who can
raise an unlimited amount of capital is a “small issuer.” Yet, the SEC, in the Regulation D Adopting
Release (1982), curiously stated Regulation D, as a whole and inclusive of Rule 506, was intended to be
the central element in a framework that was responsive to section 19 of the 33 Act, as amended by the
SBIIA. See Regulation D Adopting Release (1982), at 11,251-52. This blurring of the distinction
between a legitimately small issuer (who ostensibly should be the beneficiary of relaxed capital
formation regulation) and other kinds of issuers has continued through the present, and, as discussed at
length in Part II, significantly drove the congressional narrative behind Title II of the JOBS Act.
20 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(3)(C) (2014); see also Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 505, 94 Stat. 2275, 2293 (1980) (emphasis added).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(3)(C) (2014).
22 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b) (2014). Although states retained and continue to retain the authority to
investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to, among other things, fraud or deceit, in
connection with securities or securities transactions. See Jill D. Meyer, Federal Preemption of the Rule
506 Exemption, 37 No. 2 SEC. REG. L.J. ART. 2 (2009).
23 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2014).
19
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In summary, the overarching regulatory state of play under Rule 506 is
actually quite simple. So long as an issuer meets the requirements of Rule
506 with respect to an offering, that offering need not be registered under
the federal securities laws. Further, because Rule 506 offerings are of
“covered securities,” the states are summarily preempted from regulating
them.
A preliminary observation can be made at this point: Rule 506 is an
extremely powerful exemption, for it removes an offering of securities from
the ambit of both federal and state regulation. Though the state and federal
governments retain the authority to investigate and prosecute fraud in a
Rule 506 offering,24 such an offering is cloaked with the presumption of
legitimacy. The mechanics of the exemption actually potentially permit
(and have permitted) fraudulent Rule 506 offerings to operate for an
indefinite period of time, free from all regulatory scrutiny.25 This has led at
least one commentator to refer to Rule 506 offerings as a “regulatory black
hole.”26
B. Digging Deeper: Into the Text, from the Top Down
This is not to say Rule 506 is bereft of internal defenses to combat
misuse and abuse. Similarly, neither the SEC nor Congress intended to
authorize a far-reaching, blanket exemption that could operate wholly
beyond the “salutary” effects of the securities laws.27 As I suggested at the
beginning of this Comment, one of the most critical of these defenses has
been the ban on general solicitation.
However, before focusing on the regulatory, congressional, and other
motivations behind Rule 506, it is important to understand how Rule 506
actually works. What does an issuer “get” when it claims the exemption?
How does an issuer claim the exemption? What are the conditions for
claiming it?
This subsection begins by answering these basic questions. This initial
discussion will also disclose the embedded judgment (or merely
acknowledge the reality) that Rule 506 offerings are, in general,
24

See Meyer, supra note 22.
Such frauds include the CD component of the high-profile Stanford International Bank Ponzi
scheme, Provident Royalties, LLC, and Medical Capital Holdings Inc. See Complaint at 10, SEC v.
Stanford International Bank Ltd., No. 3-09CV0298-L (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009) (Stanford Ponzi
scheme); Bruce Kelly, B-D to Pay Clients $700K to Settle Private-Placement Suits, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Feb. 14, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110214/FREE/110219966/b-d-topay-clients-700k-to-settle-private-placement-suits (discussing Provident Royalties and Medical Capital
Holdings frauds).
26 Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151,
155 (2010).
27 H.R. REP. 96-1341, at 20 (1980).
25
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exceptionally risky, and that the appropriate method of managing that risk is
not regulating what those offerings do (which is one kind of regulatory
modus operandi), but regulating who can access (and operate) them. A
second embedded judgment will emerge from this discussion: by and large,
the rewards and benefits of the offerings covered by the Rule are
worthwhile despite their risks, and investors should have access to these
opportunities.
A close reading of original Rule 506, or Rule 506(b),28 follows and
shows that three specific concerns animated the Rule’s drafting: (1) investor
protection (specifically through limitation: limitation as to kinds of
investors; participation by certain kinds of investors; manner of offering);
(2) egalitarianism (i.e., Rule 506(b) investment opportunities should not
solely be the province of the rich or the specially situated); and (3) fairness
(all investors should be placed on equal footing with one another and with
the issuer).
Finally, an examination of Rule 506(c) reveals all three of these
principles are absent in that new Rule,29 as it embodies an entirely different
regulatory calculus.
1. Rule 506: The Basics
i. What the Issuer “Gets”
As discussed above, Rule 506 is a safe harbor under section 4(a)(2) of
the 33 Act. Since September 23, 2013, the effective date of the July 2013
amendment, Rule 506 provides two paths to this safe harbor: Rule 506(b) is
the original Rule 506 exemption, first promulgated by the SEC in 1982,30
while Rule 506(c) responds directly to the JOBS Act’s congressional
mandate to eliminate the prohibition on general solicitation that continues
to characterize Rule 506(b).31 An issuer may claim either Rule 506(b) or
Rule 506(c); the exemptive effect on the offering is largely the same,
though the conditions associated with each differ in important ways.
Accordingly, when an issuer meets either exemption’s requirements
with respect to an offering, that offering is protected from registration
pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the 33 Act. Further, through operation of
NSMIA, the state’s regulatory gaze is preempted. In short, upon claiming a
Rule 506 exemption with respect to an offering, an issuer receives
28
29
30

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014); Regulation D Adopting Release (1982), supra note 19, at

11,261.
31

(2012).

See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313-14
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immunity from regulation (excepting for fraud) of that offering at both the
state and federal levels. Additionally, as Rule 506 is a nonexclusive safe
harbor, an issuer may claim it while also relying on other exemptions.32
Rule 506 is unique in that it permits an issuer to raise an unlimited
amount of capital.33 Other Regulation D Rules—namely, Rule 50434 and
Rule 50535—limit the amount of capital that can be raised. The ability to
raise unlimited capital, exclusive to Rule 506, is another reason why the
Rule is so useful—and powerful.
ii. Procedure for Claiming the Exemption
Actually claiming an exemption under Rule 506 is a relatively simple
matter. An issuer must comply with the specific conditions of Rule 506(b)
or Rule 506(c) as well as certain general terms and conditions discussed
more completely below. Then, the issuer must file a Form D with the
SEC36 and, typically, with any states where securities are sold.37 The Form
D is a “notice filing” to each regulator who receives it, not a registration
statement. It requires the issuer to disclose, among other things, its name,
address, related persons,38 size (in terms of revenue range or, in the case of
investment funds, aggregate net asset value range), and number of investors
who have already invested in the offering (including a disclosure as to
whether any are “nonaccredited”).39 The issuer must also disclose certain
information about sales compensation, including the identity of the
recipients of such compensation, who may or may not be associated with a
broker-dealer.40
An amendment to an initially filed Form D is only required once
annually (if the offering is continuing) and upon the occurrence of certain

32

For example, an issuer can simultaneously claim exemptions under both Rule 506 and section
4(a)(2), generally. In such an instance, if the issuer fails to establish that its offering complies with the
terms of the Rule 506 safe harbor, the issuer may still be successful in showing its offering is exempt
under section 4(a)(2) because it does “not involv[e] any public offering.” See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2)
(2014). However, because section 4(a)(2) is not a safe harbor, relying on it places the burden of proving
the exemption on the issuer. Further, the securities of section 4(a)(2) offerings are not covered securities
under section 18 of the 33 Act in the same way Rule 506 securities are: section 4(a)(2) is not an SEC
rule or regulation. Accordingly, issuers relying on section 4(a)(2) lose the benefit of state regulatory
preemption.
33
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
34
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014).
35
17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2014).
36
17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2014).
37
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2a (2014); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 130.293(a)(1) (2014)
(providing Illinois’s notice-filing requirements for issuers relying on Rule 506).
38
These include individuals such as the issuer’s executive officers, directors, and promoters.
39
See SEC Form D, at 1-4, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.
40
Id. at 3.
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specific events.41 Importantly, as of the date of this writing, filing a Form D
or updating a previously filed Form D, even in the event of the termination
or closing of a Rule 506 offering, is not a precondition of claiming an
exemption under Rule 506.42
iii. General Terms and Conditions
As aforementioned, certain general terms and conditions outside of
Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) must be observed or met to claim either
exemption. These include: (1) the accredited investor concept, and (2) the
bad actor disqualification. The former concept is articulated in Rule 501(a)
of Regulation D,43 while the latter was added to Rule 506 as Rule 506(d)
effective September 2013.44 Certain other relevant general terms and
conditions can be found throughout Regulation D, though these are not
covered exhaustively here.45

41
Id. at 5. These specific events are: (1) “to correct a material mistake of fact or error in [a]
previously filed notice, as soon as practicable after discovery of the mistake or error,” and (2) to reflect a
change in certain responses included in the form. Id. The Form D provides a list of response changes
which do not trigger an amendment. See id.
42
On July 10, 2013, the SEC proposed further amendments to Regulation D to make filing and
updating (including at the offering’s closing) a Form D a requirement of the Rule 506 exemption. The
proposed amendments would also change the timing of filings with respect to Rule 506(c) offerings.
Instead of filing the Form D no more than fifteen days from the date of the first sale of securities, the
proposed rules would require filing a Form D no less than fifteen days prior to the day of first sale (an
“Advance Form D”). The Advance Form D would request less information than the full Form D,
though the issuer would be obligated to complete the remainder of the Form D no more than fifteen days
after the first sale of securities. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9416, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69960, Investment Company Act Release No. IC30595, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806, at 44,810-11 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter July 10, 2013, Proposing
Release].
43
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014).
44
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2014).
45
Certain of these general terms and conditions are discussed in conjunction with the close
reading of Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). Still others are not comprehensively covered in this Comment,
but remain important, such as the principle of integration and limitation on resale. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(a), (d) (2014). Though these last two are somewhat more procedural than the conditions
discussed at length herein, they are both essential to all Regulation D offerings. Rule 502(a) provides
for “integration” of securities sales into a single Regulation D offering under certain circumstances. 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2014). This means that a series of offers and sales made by an issuer over an
extended period of time may be considered a single Regulation D offering. In order for the issuer to
advantage itself of a Regulation D exemption, each offer and sale must individually meet the
requirements of Regulation D. Accordingly, if any one offer or sale in an integrated offering does not
comply with the requirements of Regulation D, the issuer may not be able to claim the Regulation D
exemption. Whether two or more offerings will be deemed integrated generally depends on a factintensive analysis, though there are some temporal bright lines that issuers may rely on to sever multiple
offerings from one another. Rule 502(d) limits the resale of Regulation D securities such that the
securities may not be resold without being registered under the 33 Act or subject to some other
exemption from registration. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2014).
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a. The Accredited Investor
Rule 501(a)’s definition of “accredited investor” is integral to the
operation of Rule 506. Only accredited investors enjoy unlimited
participation in offerings exempted from registration under either Rule
506(b) or Rule 506(c).46 Accordingly, whether an investor is accredited can
determine whether that investor may participate in a Rule 506 offering at
all.47
Rule 501(a) contemplates eight categories of accredited investors and
embraces both natural and non-natural persons (i.e., corporations,
partnerships, and the like). These categories are all defined with reference
to one or more of an investor’s (1) net assets or net worth (that is, wealth),48
(2) income,49 or (3) status.50 Though perhaps not apparent from the bare
definitions of Rule 501(a), Regulation D’s accredited investor concept
embodies the presumption that individuals or entities, either due to their
very nature or their wealth or income, can “fend for themselves” in
offerings unfettered by the requirements of registration.51 What constitutes
the ability to fend for oneself has never been precisely defined; only over
time did the accreditation categories become a proxy for the ability.
Historically, the ability has been evidenced by the capacity (the “knowledge
and experience” sufficient)52 to appreciate and evaluate the risks and merits
of an investment and, in certain cases, the ability to bear the economic risks
associated with an investment.
It is increasingly doubtful the accreditation standards that hinge on
wealth and income, in particular, continue to meaningfully represent either
of the historical elements of the ability to fend for oneself. This is because
the accreditation wealth and income thresholds have remained largely
unchanged for thirty years despite the inexorable march of inflation.53
46 Rule 506(b) (i.e., originally enacted Rule 506) also permits up to thirty-five nonaccredited
“purchasers” to participate in a Rule 506(b) offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
47 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i), (c)(2)(i) (2014).
48 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2014).
49 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2014).
50 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2014) (accrediting directors, executive officers, and
general partners of an issuer). “Status” may also refer to an entity’s ability to fit within a certain
statutory definition or registration status. For example, Rule 501(a)(1) accredits any bank as defined
under section 3(a)(2) of the 33 Act. Rule 501(a)(1) also accredits “any broker or dealer registered
pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2014).
51 The importance of investors’ ability to “fend for themselves” in the context of offerings
exempt under section 4(a)(2) was first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1953. See infra pp. 268-69.
52 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014). As discussed below, such knowledge and experience is
also called investor sophistication. See Rule 506 of Regulation D, supra note 14 (defining sophistication
as “hav[ing] sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to make [the
investor] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment”).
53 See July 10, 2013, Proposing Release, supra note 42, at 44,808.
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Further analysis on this score will be provided in Part II. For now it is
enough to say that the capacity to fend for oneself is one of the “tickets to
ride” a Rule 506 offering, and accreditation remains a proxy for that ability.
Half of the eight Rule 501(a) categories are conditioned on investor
wealth or income; these categories are located at Rule 501(a)(3), Rule
501(a)(7), Rule 501(a)(5), and Rule 501(a)(6).
Rule 501(a)(3) accredits corporations or partnerships, including
nonprofit entities. For such an entity to be accredited, the entity must have
“total assets in excess of $5,000,000.”54 Additionally, the entity must not
have been “formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities
offered.”55 Rule 501(a)(7) contains substantially identical conditions to
Rule 501(a)(3), but accredits trusts as opposed to business entities.56
Rule 501(a)(5) accredits natural persons (individuals as well as
individuals together with their spouses) on the basis of individual or joint
net worth.57 Where such a person (or such a person with his or her spouse)
has a net worth (or joint net worth) in excess of $1,000,000, the person
(with his or her spouse, as applicable) is an accredited investor.58 Presently,
the calculation of net worth must exclude the person’s primary residence as
an asset.59 Similarly, any indebtedness secured by the person’s primary
residence (i.e., a mortgage) is excluded as a liability from the net worth
calculation.60
Rule 501(a)(6) also accredits natural persons, but with reference to
their individual (or joint, as the case may be) income.61 Any person whose
individual income for the two most recent years was in excess of $200,000,
or any couple whose joint income for the two most recent years was in
excess of $300,000, is accredited, provided the individual or couple has the
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current
year.62
The remainder of the accreditation categories focus on investor status,

54

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3) (2014).
Id.
56
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7) (2014).
57
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2014).
58
Id.
59
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A) (2014).
60
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(B) (2014). Except to the extent where the secured indebtedness
exceeds the estimated fair market value of the primary residence at the time of the sale of the Regulation
D securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(C) (2014). For example, where the fair market value of a
person’s primary residence is, at the time of the person’s purchase of Regulation D securities, $500,000,
and the outstanding indebtedness secured by the residence (i.e., the mortgage) is $600,000, the person’s
net worth calculation must include the excess $100,000 as a liability.
61
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2014).
62
Id.
55
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ostensibly because certain status necessarily implies an investor has the
knowledge and experience sufficient to evaluate the merits and risks of an
investment.63
b. The Bad Actor Disqualification
The bad actor disqualification located at Rule 506(d) became effective
alongside Rule 506(c) on September 23, 2013.64 However, unlike Rule
506(c), the genesis of the bad actor disqualification was the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”),
not the JOBS Act.65 Rule 506(d)’s intent is clear: to prevent individuals and
entities who have already violated the law or run afoul of regulation from
utilizing the powerful Rule 506 exemption.66
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 506(d), an issuer could not be
precluded from claiming a Rule 506 exemption even if the issuer, or one of
the issuer’s affiliates,67 had been convicted of, for example, a felony or
misdemeanor in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.68
Currently prohibited from utilizing Rule 506 by Rule 506(d) are issuers or
persons affiliated with an issuer who have committed certain “bad acts,”
provided those bad acts occurred after September 23, 2013, the effective
date of Rule 506(d).69 Issuers are required to provide all investors a written
disclosure of their and their affiliates’ bad acts, if any, which occurred prior
to September 23, 2013.70
Again, the rationale underlying the bad actor disqualification is simple:
prevent individuals and entities known to have violated the securities laws
and rules from advantaging themselves of an exemption that essentially
immunizes them from regulatory scrutiny. It is unclear why the SEC did
not promulgate such a disqualification from the outset.
It would be gratifying to interpret Rule 506(d) and Rule 506(c) as
complementary provisions, considering their simultaneous promulgation.
However, as mentioned above, they stem from different congressional
mandates. It is nevertheless fortunate the bad actor disqualification is now
in operation. Even so, considering many, if not most, prior acts receive

63

See supra note 50.
Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9414, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730, 44,730 (July 10, 2013).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 44,730-33.
67
An issuer’s affiliates include, among others, the issuer’s officers and directors. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(d)(1) (2014).
68
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1)(i)(A) (2014).
69
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1), (2) (2014).
70
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(e) (2014).
64
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“grandfathered” treatment under Rule 506(d) (i.e., they do not bar
individuals who did bad acts prior to September 23, 2013, from claiming a
Rule 506 exemption),71 the disqualification’s full impact will likely only be
felt in years hence.
iv. Checkpoint: Synthesizing the Basics
Even before proceeding with a close reading of Rule 506’s text, an
understanding of the Rule’s basics already illuminates some of its
overarching aims and rationale.
A Rule 506 offering’s liberation from federal and state regulation
means there is no “cop on the beat”72 initially or continuously monitoring
the offering or its activity. Freed from the rigors of registration, Rule 506
issuers confront few regulatory limitations with respect to their underlying
businesses and structures.73 Consequently, issuers have an incredible
degree of liberty in pursuing their capital-raising and business objectives.
Unfortunately, this same liberty may also permit issuers to engage in
unacceptable risk-taking or practices that could result in crippling
insolvency or total collapse. Simultaneously, Rule 506 offerings are
generally free of the paradigmatic affirmative obligation associated with
registration: providing investors, initially or on an ongoing basis,
information that would allow them to identify any such problematic activity
for themselves.74 As a result, Rule 506 naturally and purposely plays host
to a bevy of speculative “start-up” or special purpose offerings, often
without track records or any qualitative or quantitative data which could
shed light on their prospects for success.
The unconstrained and oftentimes opaque nature of Rule 506 offerings
necessarily implies a high level of risk. Regulatory authorities have
quantified this risk as so much greater than that present in regulated
securities offerings that they have determined only investors who can “fend
for themselves” need apply. The exemption is so powerful that access to it
has been denied to bad actors. Yet, Rule 506’s continued existence is
testament to the fundamental belief that these exempted offerings are
necessary, and investors should have access to them. These basic
71

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(2)(i) (2014).
See Johnson, supra note 26, at 159.
73
This can be most starkly contrasted with registration by qualification or “merit review,” a
securities offering registration procedure common among the states. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 517.081
(2014) (setting forth Florida’s registration by qualification procedure).
74
In certain circumstances, Rule 506 does impose disclosure requirements. See infra pp. 25658. However, these limited disclosure requirements are significantly less burdensome than those
imposed on offerings registered under the 33 Act. Compare SEC Form S-1, http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/forms-1.pdf (registration statement required under the 33 Act), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)
(2014) (information requirements under Rule 506(b) triggered by nonaccredited investor participation).
72
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conclusions constitute the backdrop against which Rule 506(b) and Rule
506(c) should be judged. I contend, and demonstrate below, that Rule
506(b) does the best job of reconciling all of the foregoing by focusing on
three regulatory concerns, while Rule 506(c)’s weaknesses stem from
casting those concerns aside.
2. Close Reading, Part I: Rule 506(b) and Protection, Egalitarianism,
and Fairness
We turn now to Rule 506(b), the first exemption in Rule 506 proper
and the original Rule 506 exemption promulgated by the SEC in 1982.
To claim the exemption under Rule 506(b), an issuer must: (1) satisfy
the general terms and conditions of Rule 501 and Rule 502;75 (2) limit the
amount of nonaccredited “purchasers” who participate in the offering, all of
whom must meet an additional “knowledge and experience,” or
“sophistication,” requirement;76 (3) provide such nonaccredited purchasers
with certain information regarding the offering;77 and (4) observe the
limitation on the “manner of offering” (i.e., the prohibition on general
solicitation).78
Rule 506(b) evidences a regulatory philosophy of investor protection
(through limitation; for example, on the kinds of investors who can
participate) modified by egalitarian exceptions that provide individuals and
entities who do not meet the accreditation wealth, income, or status
requirements access to Rule 506(b) offerings. Rule 506(b) also expresses a
third regulatory concern: fairness. Rule 506(b) creates a level playing field
among investors (specifically, those participating through an egalitarian
exception and those who are not) and the issuer by requiring the issuer to
furnish certain information to certain investors.
i. Protection Through Limitation, Part I: No More than Thirty-Five
Purchasers
Rule 506(b)(2)(i) requires that “[t]here are no more than or the issuer
reasonably believes that there are no more than [thirty-five] purchasers of
securities” in a given Rule 506(b) offering.79 A note to Rule 506(b)(2)(i)
directs the issuer to Rule 501(e) for instructions on how to count
“purchasers.”80 Taken together, Rule 506(b)(2)(i) and Rule 501(e) function

75
76
77
78
79
80

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1) (2014); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i), (ii) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
Id.
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as a Rule 506(b) offering’s gatekeeper. While there is no limitation on the
participation of individuals and entities who are not counted as purchasers
under these provisions,81 no more than thirty-five investors and entities who
are counted as purchasers may participate.82 Who is considered a
purchaser, considered in conjunction with the accredited investor definition
contained in Rule 501(a), discussed above, defines the dynamic balance
between protective limitation and egalitarian access contained in Rule
506(b).
Any natural or non-natural person who acquires securities in an
offering is a “purchaser.”83 However, Rule 501(e) operates to exclude
certain purchasers from the total number of purchasers relevant for
compliance with Rule 506(b)(2)(i) (the “Adjusted Purchaser Count”).84
Most critically, all accredited investors are excluded from the Adjusted
Purchaser Count. Additionally excluded are (1) the relatives, including the
spouse and relatives of the spouse, who reside at the same primary
residence of any other purchaser; and (2) certain corporations and other
entities owned by a purchaser (or relatives of the purchaser who reside at
the same primary residence of the purchaser).85
Some illustrative examples may be helpful. A nonaccredited woman,
A, individually invests in a Rule 506(b) offering. Her husband, B, who is
also nonaccredited, also individually invests in the same offering. Through
operation of Rule 501(e), B is excluded from the Adjusted Purchaser Count
solely because he is the spouse of A, who is considered a purchaser. The
final Adjusted Purchaser Count in this example is one.
To expand this example, begin with the same facts as above. Ten
additional persons purchase securities in the offering A and B are
participating in. All ten persons are accredited. Again, through the
operation of Rule 501(e), each of the ten investors is excluded from the
Adjusted Purchaser Count, because each is an accredited investor.
Although a total of twelve persons have invested in the offering, the total
Adjusted Purchaser Count relevant for compliance with Rule 506(b)(2)(i) is
still just one.
81

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
83
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2014).
84
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2014).
85
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(i), (iii) (2014). Rule 501(e) provides additional guidance for
how to count non-natural persons. Generally, a corporation or other entity will be counted as a single
purchaser (unless, of course, the corporation is itself an accredited investor and is therefore excluded
from the Adjusted Purchaser Count). An exception to this general rule exists where the investing
corporation or other entity has been created solely for the purpose of acquiring securities in the offering.
In that case, each owner of equity interests in the investing entity is counted as a purchaser. This
provision prevents “pyramiding” of Rule 506 offerings to some extent.
82
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These examples demonstrate that, in most cases, the Adjusted
Purchaser Count for a given Rule 506(b) offering will be less than the
absolute number of persons who actually purchase securities in the offering.
Further, because accredited investors are excluded from the Adjusted
Purchaser Count under Rule 501(e), it is technically possible to have a Rule
506(b) offering that has an unlimited amount of accredited investors and
zero purchasers.
Simultaneously, the Adjusted Purchaser Count cap of thirty-five
imposes a limitation on nonaccredited investor participation.86 This
limitation on nonaccredited investor participation is furthered by the
Adjusted Purchaser Count never resetting when nonaccredited investor
participation decreases.87 Even when, for example, a nonaccredited
investor (i.e., a purchaser) redeems her interest in a Rule 506(b) offering,
the Adjusted Purchaser Count remains unchanged. In other words, once a
purchaser slot has been occupied by a nonaccredited investor, it can never
be vacated.88
In sum, the operation of the Adjusted Purchaser Count permits
accredited investors, clothed with the presumption they can sufficiently
fend for themselves in the context of a Rule 506(b) offering, to participate
in such offerings ad infinitum. Yet, restricting participation in Rule 506(b)
offerings to only accredited investors would be tantamount to saying that
some investment opportunities are only for specially situated persons or
“the rich.” This would cut against the notion Rule 506(b) offerings are
worthwhile investments that more than a select few investors should have
access to. The Adjusted Purchaser Count honors this latter notion, yet
recognizes the risks of unlimited nonaccredited investor participation, by
limiting the number of Rule 506(b) purchasers to thirty-five. At once, then,
the Adjusted Purchaser Count is both protective and egalitarian.

86

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1) (2014). This should not be
taken to mean the cap on nonaccredited investor participation is thirty-five. The other provisions of
Rule 501(e) (namely, the exclusion of additional nonaccredited investors from the Adjusted Purchaser
Count based on their relationship to another purchaser) theoretically permits greater participation by
nonaccredited investors. However, that provision still has its limits. For a nonaccredited investor
related to an existing purchaser to be excluded from the Adjusted Purchaser Count, that nonaccredited
investor would need to reside at the same primary residence as the existing purchaser. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(e)(1)(i) (2014).
87
See Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Securities Act Rules, SEC.GOV, https://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2015)
(Question 260.04: “Once a company sells to 35 purchasers, as calculated pursuant to Rule 501(e), the
company has reached the limitation on purchasers as set forth in Rule 506. The fact that a purchaser
subsequently transfers or redeems her securities does not reset the number of purchasers or enable the
company to sell to additional purchasers.”).
88
See id.
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ii. Raising the Bar, but Providing a Ramp: Sophistication as a
Precondition, Purchaser’s Representatives, and the Information
Requirement
Nonaccredited investors participating in a Rule 506(b) offering must
still be able to fend for themselves. However, since nonaccredited
investors, by definition, are unable to fend for themselves by virtue of their
wealth, income, or status, they must evidence that ability another way.
Specifically:
Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with
his purchaser representative(s) [must have] such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the
issuer [must] reasonably [believe] immediately prior to making any
sale that such purchaser comes within this description.89
As alluded to above, and discussed at length in Part II, the “knowledge
and experience” (also known as “sophistication”) described in Rule
506(b)(2)(ii) is synonymous with the ability to fend for oneself.
Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) seems to erect before nonaccredited investors an
additional barrier to entry just after the Adjusted Purchaser Count carves
out for them a limited access exception. Nonaccredited investors must be
able to evidence sufficient sophistication to evaluate the merits and risks of
the prospective investment. However, the doors to a Rule 506(b) offering
are not shut to those nonaccredited investors who do not themselves possess
the necessary sophistication: they may still participate in a Rule 506(b)
offering by using a “purchaser’s representative.”90
A purchaser’s representative is defined in Rule 501(i) as a person who
has the requisite knowledge and experience, either alone or together with
other purchaser’s representatives, to evaluate the merits and risks of the
potential investment.91 In effect, the purchaser’s representative confers his
or her sophistication on the nonaccredited investor by acting as a surrogate
for the investor in evaluating the investment.
Rule 501(i) requires a purchaser’s representative not be affiliated with
the issuer (with certain specific exceptions).92 Further, the purchaser must
acknowledge his or her representative in writing.93 Finally, the purchaser’s
representative must disclose to the purchaser in writing, at a reasonable time

89
90
91
92
93

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014) (emphasis added).
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(i)(2) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(i)(1) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(i)(3) (2014).
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prior to the sale of the Rule 506(b) securities, any material relationship
between the purchaser’s representative or his affiliates and the issuer or its
affiliates that (1) exists; (2) is “mutually understood to be contemplated”; or
(3) has existed during the previous two years.94 This disclosure must
include a statement of any compensation received in connection with any
relationship of that kind.95 All of these requirements protect the interests of
the unsophisticated, nonaccredited investor.
Taken in its totality, Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) again expresses the dual goals
of protection and egalitarianism. On the one hand, the knowledge and
experience requirement protects investors by limiting the universe of
prospects: if you lack the requisite sophistication and you are not
accredited, you may not invest. Standing alone, this exclusion would only
heighten the perception that Rule 506(b) offerings are “special” and only
available to certain “special” investors. More pointedly, accredited
investors’ blanket access to such offerings would only promote the
inescapable conclusion these opportunities are the exclusive province of the
specially situated or the rich. However, the purchaser’s representative
provision again presents an egalitarian path of access to these offerings for
even the nonaccredited investor who lacks, on his or her own, the necessary
sophistication.
The provisions of Regulation D and Rule 506(b) covered to this point
generally further either one or both of the first two concerns identified at the
outset of this subsection: investor protection and egalitarianism. The third
goal, fairness, is expressed in a further provision: Rule 502(b), which is
triggered when a nonaccredited investor is admitted to a Rule 506(b)
offering.96
In a Rule 506(b) offering where only accredited investors participate,
the issuer is not required to furnish those investors any information
regarding the offering.97 This is consonant with the ability to fend for
oneself imputed to the accredited investor under Regulation D. The
fundamental premise is that regulation ought not interfere in transactions
between these “able” accredited investors and issuers. Yet, interference is
the order of the day when nonaccredited investors are involved.
Leaving aside whether the presumption that investors accredited under
the current standards (particularly those based on wealth or income) are
“more able” than others is a cogent one, revisiting what theoretically makes
an accredited investor accredited explains this differential treatment.

94
95
96
97

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(i)(4) (2014)
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1) (2014).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2014).
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Again, accredited investors are presumed able to fend for themselves due to
their financial position and/or their status.98 Typically, in the context of an
investment transaction, greater financial resources or special status
increases bargaining power. For example, an investor with greater financial
resources may wish to make a substantial investment. Alternatively, even if
such an investor makes a modest initial investment, that investor’s
participation represents the promise of additional follow-on investments,
perhaps in larger amounts. Accordingly, the issuer will (or should) treat
such an accredited investor at least as its equal in an earnest effort to
consummate the transaction. The issuer will likely accede to requests for
information made by the accredited investor.99
Pursuant to this logic, a nonaccredited investor, who is below the SECpromulgated wealth and income thresholds and lacks special status, has less
bargaining power than an accredited investor. Yet, these nonaccredited
investors are expressly permitted to participate in Rule 506(b) offerings.
Rule 502(b) steps in to eliminate any bargaining power disparities: it levels
the playing field so that nonaccredited investors stand on the same turf as
accredited investors and on equal footing with the issuer itself. Rule 502(b)
does this by requiring issuers furnish the nonaccredited investor, at a
“reasonable time prior to sale,” information that can roughly be subdivided
as follows: (1) nonfinancial information, (2) financial information, and (3) a
description of any and all other information furnished to accredited
investors.100 This information is buttressed by the requirement that issuers
make available to nonaccredited investors the opportunity to ask questions
and receive answers regarding the offering.101
The nonfinancial information required by Rule 502(b) is generally the
same kind of information an issuer would have to include in Part I of a
registration statement filed under the 33 Act—in other words, what a
registered offering would need to provide investors in its prospectus.102
This information encompasses, among other things: the risk factors
associated with the offering of securities; the offering’s expected or actual
use of proceeds; and an array of information about the issuer, such as a
description of the issuer’s business, its property, and any material legal
proceedings the issuer has been, is, or may be subject to.103
98

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(8) (2014).
This line of reasoning seems to require an additional, preceding assumption: that the
accredited investor would know what to ask the issuer (i.e., be sophisticated enough to fend for him- or
herself). However, the accreditation categories that focus on wealth and income, in particular, tend to
deemphasize this ability.
100
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2014).
101
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(v) (2014).
102
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (2014), with SEC Form S-1, supra note 74.
103
See SEC Form S-1, supra note 74.
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The financial information required by Rule 502(b) varies depending on
the size of the offering. Under Rule 502(b), offerings are divided among
three tiers: (1) those up to $2,000,000; (2) those up to $7,500,000; and (3)
those over $7,500,000.104 As discussed above, Rule 506 permits issuers to
raise an unlimited amount of capital, which generally gives rise to offerings
of indefinite size automatically falling into the third tier. Such an offering
must provide to nonaccredited investors a financial statement certified by an
independent public accountant, as would be required under the 33 Act.105
Generally, procuring such a financial statement may be extremely costly,
particularly in the context of a start-up. Rule 502(b) provides that an issuer
who is not a limited partnership, and who cannot obtain a certified financial
statement without unreasonable effort or expense, may furnish
nonaccredited investors a balance sheet dated within 120 days of the start of
the offering.106 Limited partnerships who cannot obtain a certified financial
statement without unreasonable effort or expense may furnish “financial
statements that have been prepared on the basis of Federal income tax
requirements and examined and reported on in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards by an independent public or certified
accountant.”107 Additional information may need to be furnished if the
issuer is subject to certain reporting requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.108
Finally, Rule 502(b) requires an issuer who has provided any “material
written information concerning the offering” to any accredited investor to
also provide a brief written description of that information to any potential
nonaccredited investor at a reasonable time prior to a sale of securities.109
Facially, these requirements resemble something like “registration
lite.” Although the issuer is not required to submit any of these materials to
the SEC or any state regulator, it is nevertheless true that, to comply with
all the conditions of Rule 506(b) and the relevant general conditions of
Regulation D, the issuer would have to take many of the same steps
associated with registering under the 33 Act outright, such as providing
written information in narrative and financial statement form. Recalling
that all Rule 506 offerings are subject to the various antifraud provisions
contained in the state and federal securities acts,110 the prudent issuer

104

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)-(3) (2014).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(3) (2014); see also Registration Under the Securities Act
of 1933, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).
106
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(3) (2014).
107
Id.
108
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii) (2014)
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17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv) (2014).
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Meyer, supra note 22.
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would, at minimum, also have to engage an experienced attorney and an
experienced accountant to prepare the various required materials. This
necessarily entails significant expenditures and could deter issuers from
even considering admitting nonaccredited investors to a Rule 506(b)
offering.
This result, without more, would seem to imply that the investor
protection measures triggered by nonaccredited investor participation in a
Rule 506(b) offering undermine what has been described as the
egalitarianism of Rule 506(b)—that is, the ability for those who are not rich
or specially situated to participate in the investment opportunities Rule
506(b) offerings represent.
After all, if issuers will not offer to
nonaccredited investors because doing so would impose too great a burden,
nonaccredited investors are as estopped from participating in those
offerings as they would be if there were an explicit ban on nonaccredited
investor participation.
However, ending the analysis there would be somewhat facile.
Though it is true that Rule 502(b) specifically sets forth the kinds of
information an issuer must provide to nonaccredited investors, this does not
mean that issuers do not regularly provide the same information to
accredited investors who are considering investing. In point of fact, it is
extremely likely issuers are already providing this information to those
accredited investors. For one thing, the quintessential accredited investor,
the “professional investor” (i.e., an institutional investor, such as a pension
or mutual fund), has robust due diligence requirements, especially in
today’s marketplace.111 A professional investor would at minimum require
a private placement memorandum, which is industry standard. And the
antifraud provisions still apply to these materials.112 Accordingly, only a
foolhardy issuer would elect not to retain an attorney to assist in the drafting
of its memorandum. Viewed in this way, the “exorbitant costs” associated
with admitting nonaccredited investors actually are not exorbitant at all.
Instead, these costs are simply the standard costs of capital formation, for
better or for worse.
Further encouraging issuers to comply with the terms of Rule 502(b)
and offer their securities to nonaccredited investors is the simple reality that
many issuers are initially funded by the friends and family of issuer
“insiders.” While some of these friends and family may be accredited,
some may not be. That these investors can participate at the outset is
sometimes critical to the offering even getting off the ground, and, as such,
111
See, e.g., Alternative Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, AIMA Launches New Due Diligence Questionnaires,
AIMA.ORG (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/51A9EFBE-E15D4CEC-83A88A2376C6F333.
112
Meyer, supra note 22.
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converts the protective and fair informational requirements from an
untenable albatross to an acceptable cost of doing business.113
iii. Protection Through Limitation, Part II: The Prohibition Against
General Solicitation
Triggered automatically by Rule 506(b), Rule 502(c) is the limitation
on the manner of offering, the prohibition against general solicitation.114
Rule 506(c)’s centerpiece is the elimination of this prohibition.115
Rule 502(c) is written fairly straightforwardly, though its gray-area
implications have been legion. The provision prohibits an issuer offering
securities under Rule 506(b), or any person acting on the issuer’s behalf,
from using “any form of general solicitation or general advertising” to offer
or sell the Rule 506(b) securities.116 Rule 502(b) provides illustrative
examples of what kinds of general solicitation or general advertising are
impermissible.117 These include (1) “[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or
other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar
media or broadcast over television or radio”; and (2) “[a]ny seminar or
meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or
general advertising.”118
Much has been said and written about how far the prohibition against
general solicitation reaches and how ambiguous and arbitrary its reach is.119
Of course, the illustrative examples furnish some bright-line rules: it is not
permissible to advertise a Rule 506(b) offering in a newspaper. It is not
permissible to broadcast a television advertisement for an investor seminar
and then to solicit attendees to invest in a Rule 506(b) offering. But, as
there usually is at the intersection of regulation and the practices of the
regulated, there have been many, many cases at the margins.120
The SEC attempted to ameliorate some of the confusion by issuing a

113 There is, of course, an argument that the information requirements, in toto, impermissibly
impede capital formation, simply because they increase the costs of capital formation. However, this
line of argumentation is tantamount to advocating the repeal of the antifraud provisions of the 33 Act.
As I have shown, the kinds of information required by Rule 502(b) are the standard fare of professional
accredited investors; those materials are subject to the antifraud provisions; and the specter of penalties
under the antifraud provisions will typically compel an issuer to seek legal counsel and pay the requisite
fees.
114 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014).
115 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2014).
116 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014).
117 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)-(2) (2014).
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., Seth Chertok, A Theoretical Assessment of Private Placements Under Rule 506, 8
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 77 (2011).
120
See id. at 91-112.
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series of no-action letters, which at one point seemed to suggest safety
could be found in soliciting only individuals and entities with whom the
issuer had a preexisting relationship.121 More specifically, the safest kind of
relationship appeared to be one that would permit the issuer “to be aware of
the financial circumstances or sophistication” of the individual or entity.122
But the SEC also said a preexisting relationship is but one factor in
determining whether an offer violates Rule 502(c).123
Questions persisted. Was there a numerical limit to the amount of
investors that could be solicited? Were there situations where investors
with whom the issuer had no preexisting relationship could be solicited,
particularly when they were known to be accredited and sophisticated?
Even now, compliance with Rule 502(c) remains subject to case-by-case
analysis.124
Barring all ambiguity, however, Rule 502(c)’s animating value is
clear: before there can be any discussion of who can invest,125 there is the
practical question of how many. With general solicitation out-of-bounds,
the answer to the latter question is some number less than the entire
investing public. Importantly, the ban on general solicitation is blind to the
accreditation status of investors—general solicitation to only accredited
investors is as forbidden as general solicitation to nonaccredited investors.
Accordingly, Rule 502(c) serves a single purpose: it limits the absolute
number of persons who can be solicited to participate, irrespective of who
those persons are.
This limitation on the manner of offering, and resulting limitation on
the universe of possible investors, clearly and independently serves the goal
of investor protection which is at the heart of all securities regulation. As
discussed at the outset of this analysis, Rule 506(b) is an extremely
powerful exemption; Rule 506(b) offerings are preemptively removed from
the gaze of regulators. Too, Rule 506(b) offerings are comparatively riskier
than most registered offerings, since neither Rule 506(b) nor Regulation D
limits the “content” of such offerings or requires those offerings be vetted
by any regulator before beginning. Finally, the procedural barrier to entry
is low—really, at barest bones, merely a notice filing.126 Accordingly, it is
a hospitable exemption for start-ups, other unproven entities, and outright

121
See, e.g., Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55694
(Dec. 4, 1985).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See, e.g., Randall S. Dalton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45369 (June 22, 1984).
125
Which is handled by the accreditation provisions, the Adjusted Purchaser Count provisions,
and Rule 506(b)(2)(ii).
126 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2014); see supra pp. 246-47.
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fraudulent enterprises.
The prohibition against general solicitation is a “buffer,” a
counterbalancing measure to rein in and manage what could become a
regulatory no-man’s-land. Put simply, issuers advantaging themselves of
Rule 506(b) can only reach a portion of the investing public. This narrows
an issuer’s prospects for capital raising, yes, but it also significantly limits
the pool of potential victims should the issuer be ill intentioned (or merely
negligently managed).
The prohibition is not arbitrary; it is logically consistent with section
4(a)(2) of the 33 Act, the authority for Rule 506(b). Section 4(a)(2)
exempts from registration offerings of securities “not involving any public
offering.”127 The opposite of “public” is “private.” The plain meaning of
“private” is “intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person,
group, or class.”128 Though it is true that a safe harbor under section
4(a)(2), drafted with reference to the plain meaning definition of “private,”
would not necessarily proscribe general advertising, such a proscription
would not be inconsistent with that plain meaning.129
Ultimately, Rule 502(c)’s practical imprecision remains its difficulty.
However, there is something to be said about its longevity. Rule 502(c)
remains integral to Rule 506(b) and also continues to apply to Rule 504 and
Rule 505 of Regulation D.130 It has served its purpose for over thirty years.
iv. The Goals of Rule 506(b)
Careful exploration of Rule 506(b) and the Regulation D provisions it
implicates leads to concrete conclusions regarding what animates Rule
506(b).
One concern underlying the entire project, yet left chiefly as an
unstated premise in this Rule 506(b)-specific analysis, is the encouragement
and facilitation of capital formation. Without question, liberation from the
hard and fast requirements of registration under the 33 Act does encourage
and facilitate capital formation. Even though Rule 506(b) is not truly
designed for issuers to set up shop one day, then begin offering securities
127

15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2014).
Private, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
private (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
129 Concededly, the plain meaning of “private” could also be used to authorize a safe harbor
under section 4(a)(2) that permits unlimited investment by accredited investors—investors of a
particular class. This is precisely what Rule 506(c) is. However, as discussed in Part II, the definitive
judicial interpretation of section 4(a)(2) did not merely adopt the plain meaning of “private.” That
judicial interpretation also did not prevent the SEC from adopting its original interpretation of “private,”
which involved the barring of all general solicitation. See generally SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953).
130
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2014).
128
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another,131 there is a considerable difference, in terms of expense, effort,
and especially time, between preparing a private placement memorandum in
consultation with a private attorney and drafting a prospectus which must
be reviewed and approved by a securities administrator.
Three other concerns have been covered in this section: investor
protection, egalitarianism, and fairness. These three concerns, taken
together, explain the intricate interlocking of the provisions of Rule 506(b)
and the relevant portions of Rule 501 and Rule 502. Protection is achieved
by limiting not only the kinds (accredited and/or otherwise sophisticated
investors), but the number of investors (no more than thirty-five
nonaccredited, but sophisticated investors; only those investors the issuer
can properly reach without violating the prohibition on general solicitation)
who can access a given Rule 506(b) offering. Egalitarianism is furthered
through the dual operation of the Adjusted Purchaser Count and the
purchaser’s representative provision, which allows not just the rich (as
measured by wealth and income) or those specially situated (investors of a
certain status) access to Rule 506(b) offerings. Finally, fairness is achieved
by leveling the playing field among and between investors and the issuer by
compelling the issuer to provide additional disclosure to those investors
who are deemed to have lower bargaining power (nonaccredited investors).
That each provision supports and complements the others reveals this
interlocking was carefully considered.
Though commentators have
criticized Rule 506(b) over the many years it has been in service,132 and
though it very clearly had and has its weaknesses, the balance it attempted
to reach was and is admirable. Unfortunately, with the advent of Rule
506(c), that delicately crafted balance may have entered the final stretch to
obsolescence.
3. Close Reading, Part II: Rule 506(c) and the New Regulatory
Calculus
Rule 506(c) was added to Rule 506 effective September 23, 2013.133 It
was the first substantive revision to Rule 506 since its 1982 enactment. As
discussed above, Rule 506(c) represented the SEC’s compliance with the
JOBS Act’s mandate to remove the prohibition against solicitation
associated with Rule 506.134 Importantly, Rule 506(c) did not replace

131
For they likely still need to assemble appropriate documentation to furnish to potential
investors—accredited and nonaccredited alike.
132
See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation
and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
133
Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 44,772.
134
Id.
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original Rule 506, which remains within Regulation D as Rule 506(b).135
The general terms and conditions applicable to Rule 506(b) apply with
equal force to Rule 506(c)—the accredited investor concept, the principle of
integration, the limitation on resale, and the much newer bad actor
disqualification all obtain here.136 However, Rule 506(c) marks a radical
departure from Rule 506(b) in two major ways: (1) only accredited
investors are permitted to participate in a Rule 506(c) offering,137 and (2)
the prohibition against general solicitation contained in Rule 502(c) does
not apply.138 Though these changes seem subtle, they represent a
fundamental departure from the regulatory calculus that animates Rule
506(b).
Specifically, the changes either excise or significantly limit the
expression of all the regulatory concerns—investor protection through
limitation, egalitarianism, and fairness—that characterize Rule 506(b).
Instead, Rule 506(c) embodies a political judgment, mediated through SEC
rulemaking, that absolute expediency of capital formation in Rule 506
offerings is desirable and that such offerings are properly available only to
the rich or the specially situated.
Simultaneously, Rule 506(c)’s protective mechanisms are hobbled, and
not only through the abandonment of the prohibition against general
solicitation. Significantly undermining the Rule’s protective function are
(1) lax controls on verifying the status of accredited investors, and (2) the
continued absence of an enforcement mechanism that will vigilantly and
proactively identify and halt offerings merely purporting to operate
pursuant to Rule 506(c).
i. Only Accredited Investors
Only accredited investors may participate in a Rule 506(c) offering.139
A novel addition to Rule 506(c) is that the issuer must take “reasonable
steps” to verify each accredited investor’s status.140 However, echoing the
much-reviled ambiguity of Rule 502(c), Rule 506(c)(2)(ii) provides only a
number of “non-exclusive [sic] and non-mandatory methods” issuers may
use to accomplish accreditation verification.141 These methods include: (1)
reviewing the investor’s Internal Revenue Service forms for the
immediately preceding two years (where accreditation is based on income);
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014).
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c), (d) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i) (2014).
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
Id.
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(2) reviewing bank statements, brokerage statements, other statements, and
consumer reports showing liabilities (where accreditation is based on net
worth or net assets); and (3) obtaining a written confirmation from any of a
registered broker-dealer, an investment adviser registered with the SEC, an
attorney, or a certified public accountant confirming that party took
reasonable steps to verify the investor’s accreditation status within the
preceding three months.142
Some commentators railed against the very suggestion that Rule
506(c) investors might be required to do anything other than self-certify
their accreditation status.143 The SEC acknowledged this backlash in Rule
506(c)’s Adopting Release, stressing that the methods of accreditation
verification enumerated in the Rule are merely nonexclusive and nonmandatory and what constitutes an appropriate verification method in the
context of a given offering will depend on the “facts and circumstances.”144
Of course, the provision that only accredited investors may participate
in a Rule 506(c) offering necessarily means absolutely no nonaccredited
investors, irrespective of their sophistication, need apply.
ii. Lifting the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
Rule 502(c) does not apply to Rule 506(c) offerings.145 Rule 506(c)
provides no guidance as to what may or may not constitute an appropriate
general solicitation. Facially, then, under Rule 506(c), any kind of general
solicitation or general advertising goes.
On July 10, 2013, when Rule 506(c) was adopted, the SEC also
proposed additional amendments to Regulation D.146 One of the proposed
amendments, which would create Rule 509, would require all Rule 506(c)
issuers to include certain legends in any written general solicitation
materials used in a Rule 506(c) offering.147 Another proposed amendment
would create Rule 510T, which would require issuers to submit to the SEC,
on a temporary basis, any written general solicitation materials used in
connection with a Rule 506(c) offering.148 Under Rule 510T, written
142

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(C) (2014).
Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 44,777, 44,777 n.75.
144
Id. at 44,777.
145
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2014).
146
See generally July 10, 2013, Proposing Release, supra note 42. In addition to the two
proposed amendments discussed here, the July 10, 2013, Proposing Release also requested comments
regarding the current accredited investor standards for natural persons contained in Rule 501(a).
According to the July 10, 2013, Proposing Release, the SEC had begun a review of definition of
accredited investors with respect to natural persons. However, as of the date of this writing, no further
action has been taken. See also infra note 186.
147
July 10, 2013, Proposing Release, supra note 42, at 44,821-22.
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Id. at 44,828-29.
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general solicitation materials would need to be submitted to the SEC no
later than the date of the first use of the materials in the offering.149 As
proposed, Rule 510T would expire two years from its effective date.150
Comments were solicited on the July 10, 2013, proposals; the
comment period ended September 23, 2013, the date Rule 506(c) became
effective.151 On September 27, 2013, the comment period was reopened
until November 4, 2013.152 As of the date of this writing, no further action
has been taken with respect to any of the amendments contemplated in the
July 10, 2013, Proposing Release.
iii. A New, Fundamentally Different Regulatory Calculus
Rule 506(c) declares that whatever ameliorative effects the prohibition
against general solicitation had, their absence is compensated for by the
elimination of participation by nonaccredited investors, or those investors
not presumed “able to fend for themselves.” However, as discussed above,
Rule 502(c) largely functions to constrain Rule 506’s inherent power by
limiting the universe of potential investors, irrespective of whether they are
accredited or not. Restricting participation in Rule 506(c) offerings to only
accredited investors does nothing to bridle Rule 506’s potential for abuse.
Accordingly, Rule 506(c) cannot be considered an exercise in one-toone cancelation, trading like for like. Instead, Rule 506(c) is best
understood as embodying a new regulatory calculus, wholly different than
the one animating Rule 506(b).
Key to understanding this new regulatory calculus is the recognition
that nearly all the principles animating Rule 506(b) are no longer in play.
Rule 506(b)’s unique method of furthering investor protection through
limitation (on the manner of offering and the number of investors) is gone.
Egalitarianism is absent here; if you are not accredited, you can have no
part in the offering, irrespective of your personal knowledge and
experience. Accordingly, the expression of fairness contained in Rule
506(b), particularly through the information requirements, is rendered
obsolete.
Without the interplay of those three concerns, Rule 506(c) is merely an
effective engine to amass capital, quickly and in large amounts, from
investors who can successfully check a box on an accredited investor
questionnaire. Its sole protective mechanism is an exclusive reliance on
149

Id. at 44,828.
Id.
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Id. at 44,806.
152
Amendments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156; Re-opening of Comment Period,
Securities Act Release No. 33-9458, Exchange Act Release No. 34-70538, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,222 (Sept.
27, 2013).
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accredited investor standards that are, at minimum, presently doubtful.
The philosophical disjunction between Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) is
apparent from the text. The practical and historical study of Rule 506(c)
contained in Part II only independently confirms this disjunction.
II. STRESS POINTS: TWO PRACTICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDIES
Part I established, strictly through a close reading of the text, the
philosophical disjunction between Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). It
suggested that Rule 506(b) more intelligently serves the goals of securities
regulation by striking a delicate balance between capital formation
efficiency and the threefold aims of investor protection, egalitarianism, and
fairness. Part II departs from the text to demonstrate that this philosophical
disjunction is not exclusive to the text, but can be identified upon
examination of the legal, regulatory, and legislative history of Rule 506(c)
and the concepts it relies most heavily upon.
Specifically, Part II highlights two “stress points” contained within
Rule 506(c). The first stress point is Rule 506(c)’s complete reliance on the
accredited investor concept to achieve investor protection. Is this exclusive
reliance (particularly in the context of accreditation through wealth and
income) at all consistent with whatever historical legal and regulatory
rationale preceded it? A review of the historical development of what kinds
of investors Rule 506 and section 4(a)(2) offerings have been meant to
serve answers that question in the negative.153 Further, even if the
accredited investor standards (particularly those based on wealth and
income measures) were, at some time in the past, competent to identify
investors qualified to participate in Rule 506 offerings, do those standards
remain useful? Recent developments confirm they do not.154
The second stress point is the legislative narrative that led to Rule
506(c). The JOBS Act, including Title II, enjoyed widespread bipartisan
support.155 The rallying cry behind Title II, especially, was that the measure
would help small businesses create jobs.156 Yet, I contend Rule 506 was
neither designed for, nor actually serves the interests of, small business.
While it is true Rule 506 is used by all manner of issuers, a significant
number are not even operating businesses, or “job creators,” but private
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See infra pp. 268-70.
See infra pp. 271-73.
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www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=112&session=
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investment funds.157 The more insidious contour is that, although many,
many private investment funds have used Rule 506 responsibly, there are
also many purported private investment funds that have used Rule 506 as
nothing more than an eerily effective “vehicle for fraudulent
transactions.”158 Unfortunately, Rule 506(c) may only enable fraudsters to
reach a greater pool of victims.
A. Rule 506(c)’s Complete Reliance on the Accredited Investor Concept
Though Rule 506(c) and media accounts of Rule 506 generally might
suggest otherwise, the accreditation standards do not, in and of themselves,
represent the capacity to invest in a Rule 506 offering. Instead, the
standards are a thirty-year-old SEC-created proxy159 for the ability to fend
for oneself, an investor quality that has been a necessary ingredient of
offerings exempted from registration under section 4(a)(2) of the 33 Act
since 1953.160 Careful consideration of the historical development of the
ability to fend for oneself raises questions of whether the accreditation
standards (particularly those with wealth and income thresholds), standing
alone, rationally signify an investor’s ability to fend for him- or herself.
Further, even if the accreditation standards, at some time in the past,
accurately stood for an investor’s ability to fend for him- or herself, it is
doubtful those standards do so presently.
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court considered under
what circumstances the section 4(a)(2) exemption from registration for
“transactions not involving any public offering” under the 33 Act properly
applied.161 As the legislative history of section 4(a)(2) provided little
guidance, the Court undertook a functional analysis of the provision.162
The Court considered section 4(a)(2)’s fundamental purpose.163 As an
exemption, it was enacted to relieve issuers who claimed it from complying
with the registration provisions of the 33 Act, especially those provisions
requiring issuers to make available information thought necessary to an

157
See VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN
ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009-2012, at 12
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf.
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Johnson, supra note 26, at 188.
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Regulation D Adopting Release (1982), supra note 19, at 11,253-56.
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See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); see also Notice of Adoption of
Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933—”Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any
Public Offering,” Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1974 WL 161966, at *2 (Apr. 23, 1974)
[hereinafter Rule 146 Adopting Release].
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See generally Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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Id. at 122.
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Id. at 124-25.
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informed investment decision.164 The Court assumed that not all investors
needed the protection flowing from registration. Specifically, the Court
believed some investors were quite capable of obtaining the information
registration would ordinarily disclose on their own.165 The Court described
these investors as those “who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves.”166
Importantly, the Court did not explain what precisely constitutes an
investor’s ability to fend for him- or herself. At most, it merely suggested
at least one factor is whether the investor has access to, or can readily
obtain, the kinds of information registration would compel disclosure of.167
Ultimately, the Court held that when an offering is made only to investors
who can “fend for themselves”—whatever that entails—the offering does
not need the protections of the 33 Act, does not involve any public offering,
and is properly within the scope of the section 4(a)(2) exemption.168
As aforementioned, the SEC eventually adopted the accredited
investor standards as a proxy for the ability to fend for oneself articulated in
Ralston Purina.169 However, this adoption was neither immediate nor
inevitable. This is demonstrated by the SEC’s promulgation in 1974 of
Rule 146, the precursor to Rule 506. Rule 146 developed the idea of the
ability to fend for oneself without conditions resembling today’s accredited
investor standards.170
Rule 146, like Rule 506, functioned as a safe harbor under section
4(a)(2).171 The SEC relied heavily on Ralston Purina in crafting this safe
harbor: the availability of Rule 146 was conditioned on the nature of the
offerees and specifically their ability to fend for themselves.172 Picking up
where the Court had left off, the SEC articulated what constitutes the ability
to fend for oneself: “knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters” such that the investor is capable of “evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment” (i.e., that the investor is “sophisticated”).173
Significantly, every investor participating in a Rule 146 offering was
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169 Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities
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required to be sophisticated, either alone or with a purchaser’s
representative.174 Though Rule 146 also required certain investors to have
the “[ability] to bear the economic risk of the investment,” that requirement
kicked in only when an investor was not sophisticated on his or her own
(that is, when an investor was required to use a purchaser’s
representative).175 Accordingly, under Rule 146, investor sophistication
was the principal signifier of an investor’s ability to fend for him- or
herself. The ability to bear economic risk, whether evidenced by wealth,
income, or otherwise, was merely a contingent and additional safeguard.176
It is true that this nearly exclusive emphasis on investor sophistication
did not persist in Regulation D and Rule 506. After all, Regulation D
introduced the accredited investor concept. However, Regulation D’s new
investor qualification method was not divorced from its regulatory
antecedents, including Ralston Purina. As to why unlimited accredited
investors would be permitted to participate in Rule 506 offerings, the SEC
explained:
This approach is based on the presumption that accredited investors
can fend for themselves without the protections afforded by
registration . . . . The majority of commenters believed accredited
investors . . . have the ability to fend for themselves in larger offerings
contemplated under a Section 4(2) exemptive rule.177
Even thirty years on, this “presumption” rings at least slightly hollow,
at least with respect to those accreditation standards that hinge on wealth
and income. Nothing in Ralston Purina or Rule 146, the firmest legal
authorities for section 4(a)(2) safe harbors prior to Rule 506, suggests
economic resources, without more, sufficiently represent an investor’s
ability to fend for him- or herself. Measured solely against the historical
development of the ability to fend for oneself, accreditation standards based
on wealth and income have never been entirely rational.
Practically speaking, however, such a conclusion is based on toonarrow premises. At bottom, the accredited investor standards were
adopted for convenience and efficiency. Issuers criticized Rule 146
because its investor qualification standards required subjective
determinations.178 Subjective determinations are time consuming and
vulnerable to attack. The accredited investor concept provided issuers a
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“greater degree of clarity.”179 Simply, the accredited investor definition
essentially gave issuers a definite “qualification checklist,” obviating freefloating judgments of investor sophistication (or, in certain cases, the ability
to bear economic risk).
In the context of securities regulation, gains of efficiency are typically
positive, but ought to be appropriately counterbalanced by investor
protection efficacy and, ideally, other relevant principles, like egalitarianism
and fairness. As discussed at length in Part I, original Rule 506 actually
struck this balance. With respect to egalitarianism and fairness, original
Rule 506’s retention of investor sophistication as an alternative
precondition only confirmed that the ability to fend for oneself is not solely
a matter of wealth, income, or status.
Further, as to investor protection efficacy, it is plausible the
accreditation standards, including those based on wealth and income, were a
credible investor protection mechanism—at the time those standards were
originally promulgated. As originally conceived, the accredited investor
standards were intended to be a proxy for both sophistication (either an
investor’s own or through a purchaser’s representative) and the ability to
bear economic risk.180 This required that any static wealth or income
thresholds actually represented sophistication (or, at minimum, the means
to obtain competent surrogate sophistication) and the ability to bear the loss
of an investment in an exempted offering. A net worth of $1,000,000, or
individual income of $200,000, quite possibly carried that burden in 1982.
The problem today is that the accreditation standards have been
accorded primary importance in Rule 506(c)—yet the accreditation wealth
and income thresholds have essentially never changed. Where in 1982 a
net worth of $1,000,000 might have actually signified the ability to fend for
oneself, the erosionary power of inflation has all but assured that is no
longer the case. An investor with a net worth of $1,000,000 in 2014 is only
41% as wealthy as the same investor in 1982.181 Similarly, an investor
whose income is $200,000 in 2014 makes only 41% as much as the same
investor in 1982.182 It is simply not credible to assert an investor’s
accreditation status in 2014 means the same thing it did in 1982.
Long before the advent of Rule 506(c), under the original Rule 506
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Id. at 41,795.
See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400,
405 (Dec. 27, 2006).
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CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015); see also Greg Oguss, Note, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in
Federal Securities Laws?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285 (2012).
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regime, the need to update the accreditation standards was clear.
Particularly before the economic downturn, many middle-income investors
(by today’s standards) participated in Rule 506 offerings, accredited by
virtue of their wealth or income, only to suffer paralyzing losses or be
defrauded.183 And this was with the added protection of the prohibition
against general solicitation still in play.
In 2007, the SEC proposed revisions to the accredited investor
standards, but ultimately withdrew them.184 Only 2010’s Dodd-Frank Act
finally required the SEC review and modify, as appropriate, the accredited
investor standards for the first time in July 2014 and then at least every four
years thereafter.185 Unfortunately, Rule 506(c) became effective in
September 2013, and the SEC has taken no concrete steps since to update
the accreditation standards.186
The internal weaknesses of the accreditation standards is an additional,
significant reason why Rule 506(c)’s equivalence of “all accredited
investors” for “unfettered general solicitation” is unconvincing. Though the
continued operation of the prohibition would not have cured the defects in
the accreditation standards, it would have at least served as an investor
protection stopgap, hopefully long enough for updated accreditation
standards to be promulgated. However, many natural persons currently
accredited only with reference to the outdated wealth or income
thresholds—and who are, accordingly, actually not able to fend for
themselves—will be solicited to participate in Rule 506(c) offerings.
183
See, e.g., Amy McCullough, They Thought They Were Protected, MISS. BUS. J. (Oct. 12,
2009); see also supra note 25.
184
See generally Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8828, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-27922, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (Aug. 3,
2007).
185
July 10, 2013, Proposing Release, supra note 42, at 44,829.
186
See Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 44,772. In October 2014, the SEC’s
Investor Advisory Committee recommended the accredited investor standards be updated; its specific
suggestions and observations are consistent with many contained in this Comment. See SEC INVESTOR
ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ACCREDITED
INVESTOR DEFINITION (2014), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/
investment-advisor-accredited-definition.pdf.
However, it is doubtful the accreditation standards will be updated in the immediate future, in large part
due to internal disagreement.
Not long after the Investor Advisory Committee issued its
recommendation, one SEC Commissioner characterized interest in updating the accreditation standards
as an “obsession with ‘protecting’ millionaires . . . potentially at the cost of hindering the wildly
successful and critically important private markets . . . [it] strains logic and reason . . . . Millionaires can
fend for themselves.” See Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC’s Daniel Gallagher Questions Need to Revise
Accredited-Investor Standard, INVESTMENTNEWS (Nov. 20, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://
www.investmentnews.com/article/20141120/FREE/141129994/secs-daniel-gallagher-questions-need-torevise-accredited-investor. It is unclear whether this Commissioner has reviewed the data regarding the
wealth erosion wrought by inflation over the past thirty years or has spoken to any of the individuals
whose life savings have been wiped out by fraudulent Rule 506 offerings. See supra note 25.
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What is particularly poignant here is that the JOBS Act required Rule
506(c) to be promulgated within ninety days from April 5, 2012.187 Though
it was not promulgated until well over a year later, the congressional
directive evidenced a distinct and troubling urgency. The legislators who
enacted the JOBS Act knew the accreditation standards Rule 506(c) would
exclusively rely on were no longer viable, as confirmed by the Dodd-Frank
Act passed less than two years before. Yet, they pushed for the
promulgation of the Rule well ahead of the date any adjusted accredited
investor thresholds would take effect.
Additionally, Congress’s urgency at least in part suggests Rule 506(c)
was not as carefully considered as it could have or should have been. As a
basis for comparison, original Regulation D was proposed in August 1981,
three years after a month of preliminary hearings and an extensive review of
the then-existing exemptive scheme.188 Regulation D was not promulgated
for a further seven months, for a life cycle totaling nearly four years.189
That time was apparently well spent; as discussed at length in Part I,
Regulation D and original Rule 506 evidence careful consideration and
thoughtful drafting. Though neither Regulation D nor Rule 506 as
originally enacted was without fault, they nevertheless consistently served
the obvious goal of investor protection and also substantially furthered
other principles, like egalitarianism and fairness.
Rule 506(c) does not seem nearly as well conceived. Its centerpiece is
a faulty investor protection mechanism: outdated investor qualification
measures now removed from their legal and regulatory antecedents. Unlike
original Rule 506, where efficiency and investor protection efficacy were
pursued in equal measure, Rule 506(c) appears to seek only absolute
expediency of capital formation.
B. Title II’s Congressional Narrative
The congressional urgency in enacting Title II and interest in the
speedy promulgation of Rule 506(c) touches on the second stress point
identified at the beginning of this Part. I contend Congress deployed a
faulty narrative in seeking and ultimately passing Title II. Specifically, the
congressional record is awash with characterizations of Title II as a measure
that will “help small businesses” start up and grow, and, ultimately, “create
jobs.”190 However, Rule 506 is an outsized method for providing start-up
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See Original Regulation D Proposing Release (1981), supra note 169, at 41,792.
See Regulation D Adopting Release (1982), supra note 19.
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capital to what we typically refer to as a “small business”; other exemptions
under Regulation D appear better suited to that task. Additionally, a
significant number of Rule 506 issuers are not “job creators” at all, but
private investment funds.191
What eventually became Title II of the JOBS Act was first introduced
in the House of Representatives in late 2011 as H.R. 2940.192 The bill’s
lead sponsor, Congressman Kevin McCarthy, opened debate on the bill by
recounting the story of the deli he started when he was twenty.193 At some
point after his business became fairly successful, he wanted to open new
stores in his town.194 However, he said the bank had turned him down for a
loan, and “because of the regulations by the Federal Government,” he could
only talk to people with whom he had a preexisting relationship.195 Because
he “didn’t know people with money,” he would have had to consult with an
attorney, “file with the SEC,” and do “things that [he] did not have time to
do as a small business.”196 By Congressman McCarthy’s account, his
dream of a chain of delis evaporated in large part due to the federal
securities laws.
The Congressman’s story would be compelling if the bill he proposed,
and which ultimately became Title II, was responsive to his trials as a
younger man and small business owner. First, H.R. 2940 specifically
targeted Rule 506, which permits issuers to raise an unlimited amount of
capital.197 That his bill targeted Rule 506 implies, to some extent, that he
wished to avail himself of Rule 506 all those years ago. However, the need
to raise an unlimited amount of capital intuitively cuts against the apparent
needs of small business, especially business start-ups. Glibly, how much
did setting up a deli, or even five delis, cost during 1987 in California?
Was it really more than today’s equivalent of $1,041,971.83—the amount
Mr. McCarthy could have raised if he had availed himself of Rule 504
under Regulation D?198 Though, yes, Rule 504 would have required him to
consult an attorney and register with his state securities administrator (not
the SEC), it would have allowed him to generally advertise his offering
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throughout not only his community, but his entire state199—which, based on
his narrative, is all he wanted.
Second, again, H.R. 2940 targeted the prohibition against general
solicitation with respect to Rule 506 only—not Rule 504 or Rule 505, the
exemptions under Regulation D which would intuitively appeal to small
businesses, not to mention the exemptions which might prove more
manageable to regulate. State regulation of Rule 504 and Rule 505 is not
preempted by NSMIA, which allows state securities administrators to more
diligently protect investors from rogue offerings thereunder. Rule 504 and
Rule 505 offerings are currently capped at $1,000,000 and $5,000,000,
respectively.200 Without question, a $1,000,000 or $5,000,000 offering is
far smaller than an offering of “indefinite size,” but these smaller offerings
are completely consistent with the needs of small businesses as defined by
the government. For instance, the maximum loan amount a small business
can secure from the Small Business Administration is $5,000,000, and the
average loan size in fiscal year 2012 was $337,730, a fraction of Rule 504’s
offering size limit in 1987.201
Admittedly, all of this is at least arguable. In the financial
environment of the past several years, anything billed as economic succor is
looked at favorably. It may have been divisive or impossible to propose the
imposition of a “cap” on the growth potential of small business. (Although
this begs the question why Rule 504 and Rule 505 remain on the books at
all.)202
Still, there remains one issue that no congressperson touting H.R. 2940
addressed: the degree to which private investment funds use Rule 506.
Private investment funds, by definition,203 do not “raise capital to create
and maintain jobs, to invest in research and development, to sell and
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market goods and services . . . .”204 They raise capital to invest in
securities. While private investment funds may indirectly stimulate job
creation through investment, they are not primary job creators. Yet the data
shows such funds regularly rely on Rule 506 to offer their securities.205 In
fact, between 2009 and 2012, private investment funds raised nearly $3
trillion through Rule 506 offerings; nonfund issuers raised only 22% as
much during the same period.206
Rule 506(c) permits private investment funds, new and old, to directly
compete with Rule 506(c) operating companies for new investors. Given
the mythical status hedge funds and private equity funds (and their
managers) have in the public consciousness,207 is it reasonable to believe
persons generally solicited to invest in either a start-up company or an
“elite” private fund will actually invest in the former over the latter?
Nevertheless, it is true many operating companies use Rule 506.208
Title II may spur increased small-business capital formation; perhaps more
small businesses will find Rule 506 more accessible, now that the
prohibition against general solicitation has been lifted. However, it is
equally plausible that the real driver behind Title II was distantly related to
bona fide small business. The private fund lobby actively sought the
passage of H.R. 2940.209
Part I of this Comment spoke of egalitarianism. Although that
egalitarianism manifested itself in the form of access to investment
opportunities on the part of investors, it can and should apply with equal
force to issuers, too. To the extent Rule 506(c) runs the risk of squeezing
out bona fide small business for much larger market forces, it runs counter
to the stated mission of Title II of the JOBS Act.210
204
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III. CONCLUSION
I designed this Comment to take the reader on the same journey I
embarked on when I began my research: from believing the lifting of the
prohibition on general solicitation was merely an imprudent modification of
current law to viewing it as symptomatic of a paradigm shift, a
fundamentally different regulatory philosophy and calculus. A close
reading of Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c), as well as careful study of the
stress points discussed in Part II, demonstrate the disjunction between the
new regulatory calculus animating Rule 506(c) and the exemptive model
that presaged it.
In the introduction to this Comment, I mentioned I first intended this to
be an indictment of the lifting of the prohibition against general solicitation.
I ultimately did not write an “indictment.” More precisely, though this
Comment is full of criticism for Rule 506(c), it stops short of calling for its
repeal. That said, there are measures that can and should be taken to ensure
the new Rule serves the fundamental investor protection goals that all
securities regulation is meant to further. The weaknesses of Rule 506(c) are
susceptible to remediation through action across a number of specific areas.
I conclude by specifically enumerating three such areas.
First, the amendments contained in the SEC’s July 10, 2013, Proposing
Release.211 While those amendments remain in limbo, the SEC should
proceed with all haste to issue final rules. The protections contemplated by
those further amendments could make the difference between a workable
and unworkable Rule 506(c).
Second, the accredited investor wealth and income thresholds must be
adjusted as soon as possible, and the SEC should attend to proposals that
suggest the wealth and income thresholds should either be supplemented or
replaced by a liquid investments requirement.212
And, finally, something that has been expressed subtly throughout this
Comment: reconsideration of the scope of NSMIA’s preemption of state
law with respect to Rule 506 to promote investor protection. State
securities administrators have long advocated for the end of the
preemption.213 I would not advocate states be given plenary power over
Rule 506 offerings. However, state securities administrators should be
211
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empowered to proactively investigate, enforce, and halt illicit activity.
They are well positioned to do this, to share the burden, especially since the
SEC’s enforcement record with respect to Regulation D has been mixed.214
If appropriate time and attention are allocated to these three areas, it is
eminently possible that the new Rule 506 can overcome its shortcomings
and become a worthy successor to its parent, a regulation that served our
capital markets so faithfully for so long.
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